In 1882, Thomas Edison opened the world’s first commercial power plant, introducing electric energy to the masses. Fast forward to the present day, where electric networks have evolved beyond the local blocks and expanded into transcontinental networks, providing a common resource but unintentionally turning technological advancement into a 21st-century geopolitical imperative. In 2001, for example, former Soviet Union countries Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania synchronized their power systems under Moscow’s control to create the BRELL energy grid, relying on Soviet-era infrastructure to unify regional energy transmission; however, only three years after the establishment of the grid, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), a final step towards European integration. As the only remaining link to Russia, the three Baltic states viewed energy centralization as a vulnerability. Plans for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to decouple from the Russian power grid gained momentum following Crimea’s annexation in 2014, accelerating with Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The three Baltic countries joined the EU power grid with a full disconnect from Russian-controlled power in February 2025. Reflecting an overall decrease in dependence on Russian energy, the state’s international influence has diminished while NATO’s sphere of influence has expanded into Eastern Europe. The Baltic’s disconnect is not only a technical transition but also a pivotal moment in the struggle over governance of a common resource—energy.

        The disconnect was a step towards independence from post-Soviet control by eliminating the possibility of Russia utilizing energy output as a weapon. Negotiations that began in 2007 culminated in a move away from Russian-controlled energy, marking a victory for European security. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania regained control over their electrical systems and expressed feelings of newfound energy autonomy. As Lithuanian energy minister Žygimantas Vaičiūnas stated in a press conference, “We are now in control.” Although these states stopped buying power from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they continued to rely on the Russian grid to control frequencies and stabilize networks. By eliminating the resource imbalance, the possibility of manipulation was greatly reduced. However, not all Baltic residents support integration with Europe; many express concern over the rising energy costs. Nonetheless, the European Union lauded the decision during a ceremony in Lithuania celebrating the decision. EU chief Ursula von der Leyen commended the action as “freedom from threats [and] freedom from blackmail.” With this project, an essential part of the EU’s Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), the union provided financial and coordination support: for instance, of the €1.6 billion investment (US$1,797,360,000.00), €1.2 billion (US$1,347,860,268.00) came from EU funding. By prioritizing interoperability, the union treats energy as a collective responsibility among member states; with this support, the three countries disconnected from Russian-backed power, integrating with the union while deepening their alignment with NATO.

        The Baltic’s integration into the EU power network represents a significant erosion of Russia’s regional influence and undermines its ambitions for multipolarity. In response to the disconnection, president of RAPI (Russian Association of Baltic Studies) Nikolay Mezhevich wrote on his Telegram channel that the decision “to leave the BRELL energy ring will have consequences for several years,” furthering an ongoing disinformation campaign: Russian actors spread warnings and fabricated images in an effort to label the decision as “reckless” and “costly” despite EU assurances of grid stability. Furthermore, Russia’s EU Mission labeled the move as politically motivated, stressing the negative effects Baltic households and businesses will bear. The Baltic’s decision undermined Moscow’s goal for a multipolar world order, in which it would occupy a central role with other regional hegemons while diversifying its political ties with states outside of Europe. Russia has already sought to reassert its dominance, seen through the invasions of Crimea and Ukraine; a Russian victory would enable the implementation of Putin’s “Russian World” with a bolstered economy, increased energy, and expanded human resources. However, with the BRELL dissolution, Russia lost a large share of its energy market, further straining the state’s economy and diminishing regional influence.

        Additionally, the BRELL network’s disconnection sparked fear of Russian retaliation. Before the disconnect, numerous Baltic subsea cables and pipelines had been damaged, at least 11 cables since October 2023. Baltic security services reported a rapid increase in occurrences, with the involvement of Russian “shadow fleet” oil tankers raising concerns that the damages were intentional actions from Moscow; however, Russia denied any involvement with these incidents. In response, NATO launched the mission “Baltic Sentry,” increasing military presence and surveillance in the region to ensure the security of underwater infrastructure, as well as establishing a network to enhance information-sharing between states. Russia, however, has historically viewed such an expanded Western military presence as an intrusion on its territory and retaliated to maintain state security. Thus, potential retaliation methods could extend beyond physical threats, including cyberattacks and increased online disinformation campaigns. The Baltic governments have faced and prepared for this issue before, with government cyberattacks surging in frequency since 2022; yet, when interviewed, the Russian government denied all accusations. As tensions between Russia and EU states increase, Western Europe fears that the damage and propaganda were a deliberate part of a wider “hybrid warfare” campaign.

        The BRELL dissolution transcends energy policy, epitomizing the broader decolonization of post-Soviet states from Russian domination and signaling Russia’s diminishing authority despite Putin’s quest for a multipolar world order. By severing this last infrastructural tie to Moscow, the Baltic states redefined regional security and interconnection, transforming energy networks into instruments of sovereignty and energy into a collective responsibility. For Russia, the loss of this geopolitical instrument undermines its ability to exploit interconnectedness—a cornerstone of its asymmetric coercive doctrine. The Baltic’s grid realignment thus represents both a model for emancipating post-Soviet states and a fight for energy as a shared resource.